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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the effect of airport ownership structure on management efficiency as 
reflected through their credit ratings. A game-theoretical model is proposed to examine the 
role of credit ratings in mitigating the moral hazard problem of public-owned airports. The 
analytical results derived from the model are then used to supplement a supporting  case 
study.Notwithstanding  the fact that the less competitive environment of a public-owned 
entity and its credit ratings might bring some welfare loss , this research concludes that 
public-owned airports have some advantages. 
 
Keywords: Airport, Ownership, Revenue Bond, Credit Rating, Incentive Contract, Moral 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the recent years, private sector involvement in public sector projects has been 
growing. . Private sector involvements are particularly notable in privatization of various 
transport infrastructure projects pertaining to  the constructions and expansions of airports, 
railways and roads in many countries.  
There are two ends to the spectrum of private sector involvement in managing 
transport infrastructure. One involves complete privatization with 100% flotation; the other 
involves nationalized projects. This research focuses on the privatization issues in airport 
industry and seeks to achieve two goals. First, the  research  examines how the difference 
in ownership structure will affect social welfare. Second,  the effect of credit ratings on 
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ownership schemes in airport management is investigated.  
This paper is organized as follows: The next section provides the background of the 
Asia airport industry. Section 3 presents the game-theoretical model. Section 4 related the 
model and the airport credit ratings. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
 
Airports are vital economic assets and generators of increased economic activity in 
a country. For countries wishing to attract new industries and foreign investments, the 
presence of airports offers a strong inducement for companies to set up their businesses in a 
particular location. The economic activity generated by an airport is a result of operations 
carried out by the management, tenants and supporting and complementary businesses. 
These organizations contribute to their host countries by employing local residents, 
consuming locally supplied goods and services and by contracting port construction and 
capital improvements. Airports are also said to be the focal point at which economic 
benefits of aviation activities converge. In itself, an airport supports the overall development 
of a country such that taxes on passengers and shippers and income taxes on airport 
employees that are payable to government can be used to finance improvement programs on 
infrastructure, health care and education. Airports are also at the heart of travel and tourism 
industry. Tourism strengthens cultural ties between countries, in addition to the creation of 
many job opportunities in a diverse range of service and manufacturing industries. Other 
spin off benefits such as reducing cost of trade and movements, attracting new businesses, 
support for development of new technology and distribution process based on the rapid 
movement of people and goods.  
The increase of airport capacity is seen to be urgent and important because capacity 
limitation and congestion may be a major potential impediment to air transport growth. 
3 
 
Governments and airport operators experience perennial tensions in comparing the case for 
stretching existing facilities with that for the expansion of new facilities. While this problem 
is, perhaps, more prevalent in Europe where land restrictions new noise standards impose 
severe constraints on the scale of airport development, the reality that airport expansion and 
development projects absorb considerable land and financial resources cannot be 
understated. In recent years, the outlay to develop a new airport or upgrade an existing 
airport has increased significantly with at least two new cost drivers becoming very 
prominent. The first relates to the need for any new airport to address the whole dimension 
of security threats which have been identified following the 911 events. These have to be 
factored into the designs relating to runway and vehicular approaches to the airport, the 
circulation and layouts of terminal buildings and the introduction of new security and 
baggage handling systems and processes. The second cost driver arises from the provision 
of facilities to enable an airport to deliver higher service and performance levels. One 
example is the service demands with the arrival of the new age of mega aircraft in the mode 
of the A380s and the Boeing Dream Liner. Any new airport with pretensions to be an air 
hub can no longer rely on remote stands but to offer at least 80 percent full contact gate 
facility if it intends to mount a credible pitch for connectivity.  
According to Changi International, the construction cost2 is between 
US$25 and US$30 million per million passengers per annum (mppa) for an 
international airport terminal building in the 15 to 30 mppa range. Thus, a 
terminal building with a capacity of 25 mppa will be expected to cost between US$620 and 
US$750 million. This order of capex transforms into a whole complexion of airport 
development financing and leads to a surge in airport privatization programs and the use 
                                                   
2  This unit cost relates to the construction cost of the basic terminal building only, 
including support systems such as building services and baggage handling but excludes interior 
fit out costs and consultancy fees. 
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public-private partnerships in financing landscape of airport developments. Table 1 shows 
cost of construction and development of some huge airports in Asia between 1994 and 2008.  
Table 1 Major Airport Developments and Expansions in Asia, 1994 – 2008 
Airport Date of 
Completion  
Purpose of Development Estimated cost 
Osaka – Kansai Sep 1994 New airport to serve the 
international traffic previously 
handled by Osaka Int. airport 
USD 20 billion 
Kuala Lumpur  Jun 1998 New airport to replace Subang 
airport 
USD 3.5 billion 
Hong Kong –  
Chek Lap Kok 
Jul 1998 New airport to replace Kai Tak 
airport 
USD 20 billion 
Shanghai – Pudong Oct 1999 New airport to serve the 
international traffic previously 
handled by Shanghai Hongqiao Int. 
USD 1.7 billion 
Seoul – Incheon  Mar 2001 New airport to replace Gimpo Int. USD 5.4 billion 
Guangzhou – 
Baiyun 
Aug 2004 New airport USD 2.4 billion 
Nagoya – Chubu Feb 2005 New airport USD 7.3 billion 
Kobe Feb 2006 New airport USD 2.9 billion 
Kansai Aug 2007 Addition of runway USD 8.0 billion 
Beijing - Capital Aug 2008 Addition of the world’s biggest 
passenger terminal 
USD 3.0 billion 
Source: Low (2008) 
Therefore, the idea that an airport is a sacrosanct infrastructure on which considerations of 
national security and sovereignty reigns and the ownership of an airport should be left 
largely in the hands of the government or at least be government controlled is fast changing. 
In Japan, Narita International Airport has been commercialized and prepared for complete 
privatization. Singapore Changi is also expected to be privatized in the near future. More 
noteworthy, some of the major airports in emerging economies such as China and India 
such as Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, New Delhi and Mumbai have already developed 
5 
 
significant experience in this direction. Other airports that have been partially privatized 
includes the Malaysian airports under the Malaysia Airports Holdings Berhad. Meanwhile, 
the emergence of infrastructure funds from the private sector has now imposed new 
benchmarks for financial performance of airports. Investment returns on airports are being 
compared with those generated by utilities. 
 
2. THE MODEL 
 
This section  proposes a model to show private-private ownership (called PPP
3
 
firm) based on Tezuka and Yasuda (2004). The formulation of the profit of the PPP firm 
assumes that the profit of the firm consists of revenue from user and government transfer. 
Hence, the profit function of PPP firm is defined as: 
 
eCeyxtPPP ……….    (1) 
 
where t  denotes lump sum transfer from the government to the firm and y  represents the 
marginal monetary effects of welfare. y is interpreted as the unit benefit resulting from  the 
performance of effort x . Herein,  x  is a parameter that represents the degrees of welfare 
increased and reflects the associated cost reductions and effective products resulting from 
the input of effort.  
 
                                                   
3 PPP denotes “Public Private Partnership”. We assume some privatized infrastructure such as 
airports, toll roads are not “perfectly privatized.” For example, the share of Japanese airports 
such as Narita and Kansai are “partly” hold by governments. Sometimes, it is called 
“commercialization.” However the concept of PPP includes “commercialization.” Therefore we 
call such firm as PPP firm.  
6 
 
That is, we cannot observe x directly but can explicitly observe yx  resulting from effort
4
. 
For example, revenue can be interpreted as increased profit by the efforts of cost reduction.  
The performance parameter x  involves uncertainty. To reflect this element of 
uncertainty, we define eex  where ,0e  denotes the levels of effort and  
is a stochastic variable with 2,0N . In the last term of the right side in (1), )(eC  is a 
cost function with respect to the effort of the firm. The cost function is assumed to be a 
private cost function and cannot be observed by a third party.  
 is an important parameter to compare PPP against the  public ownership. It 
reflects degrees of competition with an inverse relationship (i.e., the smaller the , the 
more competitive is the environment). If competitive pressure exists, the firm might not 
receive enough resulting rent from the effort input. A smaller  implies less rent extracted, 
while the rent would spread and redistribute among society. We set yx  as the explicit 
revenue the firm receives; hereafter, we see the parameter  as the effect of competition 
and we set 1,0 5. 
With regards to Japanese PPP firms such as Kansai airport, some schemes of 
competitive pressure seem to be built into operating stages (inter-airport competition among 
the other airports). Generally speaking, a PPP firm does not always enjoy a monopolistic 
position to extract a monopoly rent. In such cases, we might be able to see that 1 holds 
in PPP schemes. In addition, if the firm is purely public owned and operated firm, it could 
avoid competitive pressure from market. So in that case, we set 1 to denote complete 
                                                   
4 The revenue yx which stems from the input of effort, and we assume yx  is represented in monetary 
terms. This revenue can be interpreted as profit from the users of the service. 
 
5 For the same setting, see Petersen and Rajan (1995)，Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1992). we exclude 
the fully competitive case 0 and assume 0 .Because we assume a risk-averse firm, which 
requires a risk premium, and the reservation profit would be higher than in a perfectly competitive 
environment.  
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as public operation. 
It is reasonable to assume that the purpose of government is to maximize the 
expected social welfare by controlling lump sum transfer t . We can interpret the value t  
as an operational subsidy or payment by the government. Furthermore, we  assume that 
each firm (i.e., the airport operator) is risk averse and has a constant absolute risk aversion 
(CARA) utility function. The utility function is a specialized function expressed as 
)exp()( PPPPPP ru  where parameter r  shows the degrees of risk aversity. Without 
loss of generality, we assume the reservation utility (profit) of a firm is 1. Then, we can 
derive the object function of the PFI firm using a certainty equivalent function PPPCE  
from the profit function PPP . 
222
2
1
yreCyetCEPPP                   (2) 
By using the equivalent function, we can define the expected social welfare function of PPP 
as follows:  
PPP
PFIPPP
CEyeyreCyeS
yeCEtSW
222
2
1
11
11
  (3) 
where S  denotes the expected social surplus from conducting business and has a constant 
number. We assume the value of S is large enough to operate. The second term in (2) 
represents the marginal cost of public funds  that would occur when the public sector 
pays for the firm. The main feature of the expected social welfare function is as follows: If 
the competitive mechanism could work well and  decreased, then all else being equal, it 
could increase social welfare (see the second term in equation (3)). 
It is important to note that if the competition mechanism was over-worked, then the 
incentives for cost reduction would reduce. As a result, the benefit of competition could be 
offset by the disincentive (under-input of effort) of cost reduction.(see the third terms in (3)). 
This can be interpreted as the costs and benefits of competitive pressure. Given that the 
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objective of the government is to maximize social welfare, we present our problem as 
follows: 
 
Problem: 
PPP
t
CEyeyreCyeS 222
2
1
)()1()1(max  
..ts   0
2
1 222 yreCyetCEPPP , 
 222
2
1
maxarg yreCyetePPP  
 
The problem represents the case whereby the government seeks to maximize the expected 
social welfare subject to constraints, which are called “participation constraint” and 
“incentive compatible constraint”. Assuming that the government cannot directly observe 
the efforts of the firm, incentive compatibility constraints could correspond to the conditions 
for the firm’s profit maximization from a social welfare viewpoint.  
For a specialized firm’s cost function of effort given as 2
2
e
k
eC  where 
0k , ., the PPP firm will set its effort as 
k
y
ePPP  under the incentive compatibility 
condition. From its functional purpose, it is optimal to set PPPt = PPPCE . That is, the 
government sets its lump-sum transfer equal to the firm’s participation constraint 
(reservation profit).  
It follows that the expected social welfare under a PPP scheme PPPW  can be 
derived by substituting the above solutions into its object function.  
k
ry
k
y
S
yeyre
k
yeSWPPP
1
1
2
11
2
1
2
11
222
2
2222
             (4) 
 
Then we obtain the following proposition. 
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Proposition (Tezuka and Yasuda 2004): If 0
12
k
r ，it does not hold that 0  can 
always enhance the expected social welfare. In other words, increasing competition is not 
always preferable. The expected welfare is maximized at 
112
1
*
2kr
 
Proof：We define the right hand side of (4) as the function of , F . Then, we obtain: 
S
k
y
k
ry
k
y
k
ry
k
y
SF
2
222
2
222
2 1
1
2
11
1
2
11  
If 0
12
k
r , the coefficient of 2  is negative. Then if there exist  such as 
0F , it then maximizes F . Q.E.D.  
 
Corollary 1: The higher , the lower the value of * that maximizes the expected social 
welfare.  
An intuitive interpretation of the proposition is as follows: In the case where the PPP firm is 
faced with uncertainty as 0
12
k
r , the expected social welfare could increase by 
increasing  in 1* . Within this area, increasing competition and rent 
exaggeration could enhance welfare.  
 
On the other hand, the introduction of excessive competition would decrease social welfare 
in *0  owing to a lack of incentives for cost reduction6. As we have seen in 
corollary 1, all things being equal, the larger cost of , and the more competitive the 
environment (lower alpha), the more the expected welfare we could obtain.  
 
                                                   
6 The case where k is large enough, expected welfare maximizes at 0 .  
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Figure 1 Welfare Difference between PPP firm and Public ownerships 
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          POPPP WW  
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The figure 1 shows the welfare of PPP firm, which varies with  the degrees of 
competition. As mentioned above, the value of  denotes the degrees of competition. 
Since  = 0 in the purely public owned (PO) firm, then PPP firms always dominate the 
PO firms. The difference of welfare between PPP and PO is maximized at the point of * . 
The next section highlights some implications and related the analytical findings 
with the  credit ratings. 
 
3. PUBLIC OWNERSHIP AND CREDIT RATINGS 
 
The analytical results in the preceding section suggested that a PPP scheme under a 
competitive environment is preferred to a perfectly public ownership in respect to social 
welfare. Despite the fact that the less competitive environment of a full public-owned entity 
might discourage input effort by the operator (i.e. moral hazard) and bring some welfare 
loss, the analytical results from the model reveal those public-owned airports do possess 
some advantages 
Table 2 shows the scale and level of public airport ownerships in the US. In 
comparison to the case of UK where some airports in UK are fully privatized, most of the 
US airports are owned by the government.  
11 
 
 
Table 2 Hierarchy of Public Ownerships in US Airports (2007) 
Ownership large hub midium hub small hub non hub
Local Government 17 16 36 200 269 (51.7)
Municipalities 10 12 26 116 164 (31.5)
County 5 4 9 74 92 (17.7)
Others 2 0 1 10 13 (2.5)
Federal Government 0 0 2 5 7 (1.3)
State Government 2 4 5 69 80 (15.4)
Airport Authority 6 13 20 82 121 (23.3)
Port Authority 5 3 3 16 27 (5.2)
Others 0 2 2 12 16 (3.1)
Total 30 38 68 384 520 (100.0)
Total(%)
Total number is not included GA airports and is extracted from CATS data of FAA.
  
 
The reason why most of US airports are owned by the government will be clear 
shortly. The bottom line  is whether a PPP firm would face more competitive environments 
after privatization, as compared to other forms of ownership. In some cases, even joint 
ownership firms can face such environments. Joint ownership firms are sometimes 
considered as less risky by investors. It can be expected that the government would like to 
avoid bankruptcies and protect such firms, especially in the case of Japan. 
Our model in the previous section describes the tradeoff between the introduction 
of competition, the extraction of rent and incentives in transport infrastructure projects. 
From the proposition, we derive the optimal level of extraction, i.e. the degrees of 
competition. Our model also implies that excessive competition and rent extraction would 
decrease welfare by causing disincentives to improve efficiencies and reduce costs.  
Firstly, regarding competitive environments, it might be considered that the US 
airports face competitive pressure by bond rating. Table 3 shows the use of bond issue in 
financing the operations and investment in US airports and transportation-related industries 
account for shares about 10%. These bonds are rated by bond rating company and the 
ratings could affect the late (?) of bond. The latter implies that  the rating could function as 
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“market competitor.” Under such considerations, it could be interpreted that the credit rating 
can  affect the parameter of  even if the airport  is publicly owned and we can obtain 
similar results to PPP firms in section 3. 
 
Table 3 Ratio in use of bond issue (%) 
 
Secondly, transport infrastructures such as airport and roads are of a large scale and 
involve huge and lumpy investments, which have large risks. Thus attitudes toward risk 
might differ depending on the size of the project. It might be expected that a PPP firm 
would be more risk averse than the one in joint ownership.  
We compare the case when attitudes toward risk differ. The expected social welfare 
is as follows: 
 
22222
2
1
1
1
2
11
k
y
k
y
WW POPPPPOPPP     (5) 
 
PPP  and POr denote the degree of risk aversion of a PPP firm and public ownership, 
respectively. If PPP  is large enough and PO is low, joint ownership would be preferable. 
For example, that holds if 1.  
1990-94  1995-99 2000-04 2005-09 
Transportation 10.2 10.7 11.2 11.2 
Airport 2.7 3.1 3.0 2.3 
Highway/Toll Facilities 4.3 3.4 4.6 4.9 
Mass Transit 2.3 3.8 2.9 3.1 
Others  0.8 0.4 0.8 0.9 
Education 16.9 21.9 24.9 26.2 
Health Care 12.2 12.8 8.8 12.1 
Water and Sewage System 10.0 8.3 8.1 7.6 
* Excluded the bond less than 13 months of maturity. 
The author extracted from Thomson Financial SDC Platinum database （ Oct., 2009 ） . 
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There are the following implications: In the case that a PPP firm is highly risk 
averse, the firm would require high rent. As a result, the cost of introducing harsh 
competition would override the benefit. In fact, such an argument seems to be applicable 
because it appears that the larger scale the project becomes, the more risk averse the PPP 
firm would be. In this case, joint ownership or public provision might be preferable.  
Thirdly, we represent the case that bond rate differs between PPP firms and PO 
firm: that is 
Krr
k
p
k
p
WW POPPPPOPPP ))(1(1
1
1
2
11 222
2
(6) 
where PPPr  is bond rate of PPP and POr  bond rate of PPP and K denote level of capital 
assets. If PPPPO rr  and K is large enough, then 0POPPP WW . In other words if the 
bond rating of PO is high and the levels of investment is huge enough, then the public 
ownership is preferred. 
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Fig. 2 Moody’s Credit Rating of Airport Bonds 
Source: Moody’s(2006,2008,2009), U.S. Airport Sector Outlook. 
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With regards to airport bond ratings in US, most of them are around A2, and there 
are no airports that have below Ba2 as seen in Figure 2. These high ratings of airports might 
give us the reason that public ownership preferred. 
 
 
Table  4  Indicators of Moody’s Rating 
Airport Management 
Enplanements(2005, 1,000) ，Growth over Prior Year's Enplanements(+)，Enplanement Five 
Year Average Growth Rate(+)，Primary Carrier Market Share(%・-)，O&D Enplanements 
(%)，Population of Metropolitan Area（1,000) ，Utilization Ratio(%・+)   
Airport Scale Index related assets 
Gross Fixed Assets(Million $), Net Fixed Assets(Million $) ，Long Term Debt(Million $)，Net 
Funded Debt(Million $)   
Airport Scale Index related Management  
Operating Revenues ($1,000/+) ，Non-Operating Revenues($ 1,000) ，Gross Revenue and 
Income($1,000) ，Operating Expenditures($1,000) ，Net  Income($1,000) ，Airport Revenue 
Debt Service ($1,000）  
Index related to Financial Ratio  
Debt Ratio，Debt per Enplaned Passenger，Days cash on hand(days)，Airline Payments per 
Enplanement，Operating Revenue per Enplaned Passenger，Operating Expenses per Enplaned 
Passenger ，Airline Payments/Operating Revenues，Operating Ratio(%)，Net Take-Down(%)，
Debt Service Safety Margin (%)，Debt Service Coverage by Net Income (+) 
*Parameters in Gothic were statistically significant for explaining public rating (Saegusa, Kato 
and Kurosawa(2009)). 
 
 
In addition, Table 4 shows the indicators of Moody’s Rating from Saegusa, Kato and 
Kurosawa (2009). The table denotes how public rating could be determined. The factors 
such as airport scale index, or index related financial ratio could be related parameters of 
POr  and K in (6). However, more detailed interpretation is left for our future research. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper analyzes the effect of airport ownership structure on management 
efficiency as reflected through their credit ratings. A game-theoretical model is proposed to 
examine the role of credit ratings in mitigating the moral hazard problem of public-owned 
airports. The analytical results derived from the model are then supplemented with a case 
observed in the US airport industry. The research found that t public-owned airports have 
some advantages, despite the fact that the less competitive environment of a public-owned 
entity might bring some welfare loss because of credit ratings. 
Some avenues remain for future research. In this research,  we have  provided a 
model that compares the PPP and public ownership schemes. A meaningful extension of the 
model will involve a development that is capable of examining the effect of credit rating 
directly. Also, the consideration of determinant of credit rating will be useful. .  In view of 
the potential theoretical contributions and many practical applications, we conclude that  
there is much potential for further developments of our model. 
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